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Abstract—The Tor network relies on individuals to set up relays
for it to operate. Campaigns have in the past been successfully
made to invite more people to join, and the network currently
consists of close to 6,500 relays, spread globally. Although the
Latin American region has many characteristics that make it
natural to expect a wide participation in Tor, it has lagged
behind most of the world in its Tor activity — Both considering
client usage and participation as relays. This study focuses on the
difficulties the Mexican user community has faced in setting up
Tor relays, and presents how –and why– we deployed a relatively
very simple and unsophisticated network censorship reporting
system, as well as the results we have received so far. While this
is still considered a work in progress, it has yielded important
results as an aide allowing to specify the needed characteristics
for potential relays, with a clear, measurable result.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Anonymity loves company, says the adage. In our net-
worked world, this means that the technical excellence of
an anonymity technology is often second in importance to
its usability [3], as a great program with very low usability
will keep its mass adoption low — and if few people use
it, de-anonymizing one of its users becomes easier. Hence, a
fundamental concern for any anonymity-providing network is
how to get more people to adopt it.
The best known, best studied and most popular anonymiza-
tion technology is Tor [15]. It provides a low latency network,
overlaid over the regular Internet, based on onion routing [14].
Tor is a network that relies on volunteers to provide the servers
(relays) and their respective bandwidth for its operation.
One of the clearest ways people can help the Tor project
is by running new relays; several campaigns and proposals
have been launched by individuals and organizations asking
committed users to set up new relays [6][10][13].
While the campaigns have been successful on a global
scale, some regions’ participation in the network remains quite
low. In April 2017, the Tor Project started its Global South
working group [9] to increase awareness and participation in
the project for users in countries in said regions, be it as users
or as participants in the network.
As the time of this writing, the Tor network consists of
slightly over 6,300 relay nodes as reported by the Tor Metrics
site [12]. As can be seen in Fig. 1, while there was a constrant
growth in the number of relays until 2015, the number has
since remained fairly stable. Tor Metrics also reports the
number of daily users of the network to be close to two million;
the Latin American region represents only a tiny percentage,











Figure 1. Number of relays and bridges over time, 2010–2019. Source: Tor
Metrics [12]
The number of relays is not a core concern for the Tor
network, nor is –as can be understood from Fig. 2– its available
bandwidth; even though the number of relays available in the
last years has not changed, advertised bandwidth has kept
an overall increasing trend, and more importantly, consumed
bandwidth is kept close to half of it.
However, Tor relatively lacks diversity, a fundamental and
most desired property to be able to withstand deanonymization
attacks by nation-state adversaries [8]. One of the goals of
the aforementioned Global South group is to promote the
installation of Tor relays worldwide.
Tor usage throughout the world is superbly depicted in
Graham’s 2014 visualization [5]; it shows that in 2014 Mexico
had a similar amount of users as Sweden or Austria, a countries
with a tenth of Mexico’s population — and with a much
better record on human rights and freedom of the press. This
trend continues, as Tor Metrics reports all said countries in the
10,000 to 15,000 daily users range.
The number of relays ran from each of the aforementioned
countries, however, is dozens of times larger than in Mexico.
The sum of the factors so far mentioned led us to pursue
convincing other sympathizers to set up Tor relays.
Figure 2. Advertised (above) and consumed (below) bandwidth in the Tor
network, 2010–2019. Source: Tor Metrics [12]
While large numbers of relays have never been observed in
Mexico, Fig. 3 shows a clear symptom of network censorship:
while there was only one stable relay before 2013, in the lapse
of a year the number grew (partly due to the aforementioned
campaigns) to stabilize between seven and eight relays. How-
ever, in late 2015 there is a sharp drop, and while there are
some spikes, Mexico’s presence was clearly limited.
Figure 3. Number of relays in Mexico, 2008–2019. Source: Tor Metrics
[12]
Besides anecdotal evidence by several former relay opera-
tors, we have found online reports from around the time this
censorship was instated [1].
During 2017 and 2018, our project
(UNAM/DGAPA/PAPIME PE102718) in consonance with
Derechos Digitales’ (see Section VI) engaged in promoting
further relays, but it wasn’t until after we had partial results
of the project this article presents that the spike at the end of
the graph.
The results we can report so far are, sadly, not that we
managed to stop the censorship — but by finding an ISP
(Internet Service Provider) amenable to running relay nodes,
managed to successfully improve participation. However, with
this information documented, we are starting to contact rele-
vant ISPs in order to work legally and socially against their
blocking.
II. NETWORK CENSORSHIP, ARCHITECTURE OR POLICY?
When attempting to set up Tor relays in residential (Digital
Subscriber Line, or DSL) connections in Mexico, we found
they repeatedly failed to be recognized by the Metrics site.
Although we did have some anecdotal evidence pointing
towards the ISP blocking connectivity to the Tor directory
authorities (DirAuths) [1], we needed further validation to
ensure whether this was effectively due to network censorship
(and not misconfiguration).
Also, as we were embarking on a project to distribute
Raspberry Pi computers donated by the Derechos Digitales
NGO for volunteers interested in setting up a relay, we felt
necessary to do a more thorough review to check the status of
the different providers.
We identified the three following points as in need of an
answer:
1) Does the ISP actively interfere with connections?
We need to know if there are technical measures
purposefully set up by the ISP to block connections
to Tor.
2) Does the ISP perform deep NAT (Network Address
Translation) to its customer’s networks?
Due to the scarcity of IPv4 addresses, many ISPs
(specially the local ones, or the latecomers to the
market) don’t provide a network-visible IP address
to each user. Instead, several layers of NAT can be
traversed on the way to the real network (we have
detected up to seven hops inside NATted networks).
If users cannot be reached from the outside network,
there is no way they can set up relays.
3) Does the ISP allow end users to reconfigure their
routers and receive incoming connections?
Even having the necessary network capabilities to
reach the user’s connection, and allowing unfettered
access to the Tor DirAuths, residential-grade routers
are usually configured –in good measure for secu-
rity– to reject any connections not started within the
client’s network.
All modern routers have the capability to set up
network forwarding for specific ports. Not all ISPs,
though, allow the user to configure in this fashion
their routers.
Given that item number 3 needs actually reconfiguring
network equipment, we decided not to pursue it at this stage.
From the three points mentioned above, although they are
all important for the project’s goals, only item 1. qualifies as
network censorship.
III. INTERFACE DESCRIPTION
As we needed to survey different networks countrywide,
we decided to make a public call for participation: asking
individuals to run some tests for us. We needed to design a
simple task which any interested person could easily follow.
We considered adopting preexisting tools for this task,
mainly OONI (Open Observatory of Network Interference, see
Section IV for further details). However, given that our interest
was specific and limited to getting information as to give to
potential relay operators (which ISPs would be feasible to set
up relays with), we did not consider necessary to design a full
application; we decided to request information based on tools
readily available in default installations of any general-purpose
operating system.
With this in mind, we set up a simple form, reproduced in
Fig. 4, collecting only some data about the connection of each
probe, and giving instructions to run traceroute, either on Unix
or Windows-based systems. We request our users to provide
the results of running traceroute to all of the Tor DirAuths.
Traceroute, being an ICMP probing tool, has many known
shortcomings and many readily available tools would probably
do a better job. The criteria for choosing traceroute is, again,
that it is available and preinstalled in every major operating
system.
Figure 4. Interface at http://rutas.priv-anon.unam.mx with the form shown
to users when submitting a trace
We acknowledge the main blocker for this form is the
means we requested participants to submit their information
from: They have to open an interactive terminal, paste into
it a long command, wait for a couple of minutes (we have
observed run times between one and two minutes from non-
censored networks, and between four and six minutes from
censored ones) for it to finish, and paste back their results in the
browser. We reproduce here the command for Unix systems:





199.254.238.52; do traceroute $i;
done
It is far from user friendly. This design was chosen due to
the limited time and resources we had.
IV. RELATED WORK
There are many projects with different scopes aimed at de-
tecting network censorship in the context of Tor participation.
Even with this stated level of specificity, this section is far
from comprehensive.
OONI [4] is a global project aimed at finding and reporting
several instances of network censorship worldwide. OONI
operates in a fashion comparable to what Tor does, based on a
large amount of probes run continuously on hosts provided by
volunteers, performing network connections and looking for
censorship or filtering evidence in many ways, including tests
for Tor connectivity. OONI also has user-friendly applications
that can be installed in mobile devices. A major output of
OONI’s work is the interpretation of the gathered data in a
global fashion, often correlating censorship events with news
items.
The OONI application, however, includes the probes only
for web connectivity, instant messaging, network performance,
and middleboxes detection. But even in the server-based probe,
Tor connectivity is measured by trying to connect as a client
to network. Our tests verify the reachability of the DirAuths,
needed for setting up relays, but not for client connections.
Quite probably, we will be able to work with the OONI
developers to add DirAuth reachability to their probes. This is
a clear next step for our project.
The traceroute.org site, set up by Thomas Kernen [7],
provides a directory of servers offering a Web form from which
they run traceroute on behalf of the users. This site has sadly
not been updated since 2011, and thus contains many broken
links. While the linked sites do provide a valuable resource
to network administrators, it does not provide any severs in
Mexico, and is thus not suitable for our needs.
The model presented by Danezis [2] has many items com-
patible with what we try to achieve, but goes to greater lengths
to assure a given address is blocked. It also presents a series
of user connections to directory servers to detect censorship.
While Danezis’ model contemplates repeating measurements
at time intervals of one week, given the nature of participation
and our goal of not installing any software in the participating
clients, ours is based on one-shot measurements. Besides,
this work is presented as a model, not as a comparable
implementation.
Another country-specific project worth mentioning is re-
search on Internet censorship in China [16]. This works has
a very different focus than our project’s. China is probably,
together with Iran the foremost country-level censorship ex-
ample, and the researchers’ approaches are applied in a much
bigger scale. Of course, citing said article in no way means
that Mexico’s censorship is in any way comparable to China’s.
The article starts by describing the Great Firewall of China
at a BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) level, analyzing the
conformation of the Autonomous Systems (AS), and explain-
ing where they discovered the different filtering devices and
presenting the filtering not as a Great Firewall, but as an
Internet Panopticon, with local and peripherial filtering points
performing different tasks.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Throughout five months, we received 79 reports from 12
states (out of 32 in the country). Table I shows the distribution
of reported ISPs.



















The distribution is close to what we expected, with Telmex
(which spans its constituents, Uninet and Infinitum) clearly
dominating the scene.
The results are aggregated and presented, one report per
row, in a table as the one (partially) shown in Fig. 5; row colors
represent the percentage of DirAuths each IP could reach: Red
(0-25%), orange (25-50%), yellow (50–75%) and green (75-
100%).
Figure 5. Results table. Last octet of all IP addresses has been manually
obscured.
By the time this project was started, we knew for a
fact that Telmex censored connections to DirAuths; this was
confirmed, as most connections report 3 out of 11 successful
connections. There are several records showing 0/11 — Given
the similarities in them, we believe this to be caused by old
modems not properly implementing NAT forwarding support
for traceroute.
A second interesting finding was the high amount of
connections providing sufficient but still not perfect returns —
this means, connections where Tor relays could be installed,
as they can exceed the 50% mark, but not by much — Most
strikingly, the two tested connections at UNAM, Mexico’s
largest and most important university, can barely withstand
being a relay, as they can reach only 55% of the DirAuths.
This is another item to verify, both technically (what kind of
communications exactly are being censored) and politically
(why are they being censored).
Since we managed to systematize the results, we have been
inviting prospective relay operators to connect via Axtel, the
ISP that has the highest success rate. This has led to the spike
at the right of Fig. 3.
VI. FURTHER WORK
As for the reasons of the censorship, we have contacted
Customer Support for the ISP with the largest market share,
Telmex. As it was expected, they denied instrumenting this
blocking. We have started contacting the Federal Institute for
Telecommunications (IFT) so we can push for a real reply.
As it was said in the Abstract, this article presents a Work
in Progress. We still have not analyzed the records to find
evidence of deep NAT. ISPs, particularly smaller or newer
ones, do not do this because of censorship, but because of their
limited network resources; nevertheless, their connections are
being censored.
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